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TAXING PERSONAL INSURANCE: THE CASE OF TAX
AUDIT INSURANCE
William D. Popkin*
A recent brochure explaining tax audit insurance' to tax practi-
tioners warns that "[e]ven the most meticulously prepared returns
are subject to questions about the adequacy or propriety of the
documentation and substantiation which the client has accumu-
lated and maintained" and that there is "added uncertainty as to
how courts will decide complicated provisions."2 Thus warned, tax-
payers are expected to find tax audit insurance, which reimburses
policyholders for tax deficiences and, in some cases, professional
fees, attractive. From the insurance company's viewpoint, tax audit
insurance is economically feasible because the company can aggre-
gate the statistical probabilities that particular taxpayers will be
audited and spread the costs over a large number of insured
taxpayers.'
Before acquiring this new type of insurance, taxpayers must pay
careful attention to how the proceeds and premiums will be taxed.
The taxation of any type of personal insurance is difficult to deter-
mine,4 and tax audit insurance raises special problems.5 Addition-
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law (Bloomington).
Currently, tax audit insurance is only offered to individuals. See infra note 2. Conse-
quently, this article is limited to treatment of that insurance as it applies to individuals.
2 Victor 0. Schinnerer & Co., The CPA/Tax Attorney Guide to Taxright Tax Audit Insur-
ance 2 (1983) (Tax Notes Doc. No. 83-4555) [hereinafter cited as Audit Insurance Guide].
I Most tax returns are selected for audit from returns identified by statistical formula for
their revenue potential. See Comptroller Gen. of the U.S., Report to the Joint Committee on
Internal Revenue Taxation, How the Internal Revenue Service Selects Individual Income
Tax Returns for Audit 12-27 (1976). But because of the uncertainties contained in the selec-
tion process, chance remains a major factor. Different categories of risk are, of course, com-
patible with insurance, and translate into varying premiums depending upon the category of
audit risk. For example, Exhibit III of the Audit Insurance Guide, supra note 2, specifies
different premiums for twelve categories of taxpayers filing Schedule E and four categories
of taxpayers who do not file Schedule E but who itemize deductions. See id. at 21.
' See Popkin, Defining Taxable Consumption: A Comment on Personal Insurance Pre-
miums, 54 Ind. L.J. 389 (1979).
5 A recent New York State Bar Report argued that the insurance proceeds covering tax
deficiencies and professional fees would be taxable, but that the amount spent on profes-
sional fees would be deductible. See Comm. on Unreported Income and Compliance, N.Y.
State Bar Ass'n Tax Section, A Report on Tax Audit Insurance, reprinted in 22 Tax Notes
53, 55 (1984). According to the Report, the policy premium, with two exceptions, would not
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ally, widespread use of tax audit insurance has special policy
implications.
Insurance reduces the taxpayer's financial burden of an addi-
tional assessment after audit and, therefore, might encourage him
to be more aggressive in asserting questionable positions in his tax
return. The insurance contract, however, has been structured to re-
duce the taxpayer's incentive to play the tax lottery.' Professional
fees are covered only if the insurance company decides to contest
an issue.7 Tax deficiencies are covered up to $100,000 per return,
but coverage is not provided for penalties and interest, amounts
arising from acts which could result in penalties, amounts arising
from tax avoidance transactions or transactions without economic
substance, amounts arising from omissions of gross income (unless
the omission was in good faith), and amounts arising out of mathe-
matical and clerical errors.' A taxpayer is eligible for insurance
only if his return is prepared by a certified public accountant or an
attorney engaged in federal tax practice who is not suspended from
practice before the Internal Revenue Service (Service).9
Moreover, the insurance company suggests that the Government
may even benefit from tax audit insurance. Funds would be readily
available to pay the tax deficiencies, 10 and tax advisors might be
less aggressive since questionable positions could affect insurability
and the amount of premiums charged." Additionally, a require-
ment that the purchase of a tax audit insurance policy be revealed
on the return may reduce, rather than increase, the incentive to
play the tax lottery.'"
be deductible. The premiums allocable to professional fees would be deductible since the
fees would be deductible, and the premiums allocable to tax deficiencies would be deducti-
ble from any taxable proceeds which the insured collected. See id. The author of this article
agrees with some, but not all, of these conclusions. The author agrees that insurance pro-
ceeds are taxable but argues that the premiums should never be deductible, not even to
reduce taxable proceeds and not even if the expenditure covered by the insurance is itself
deductible. See infra notes 102-12 and accompanying text.
' See Audit Insurance Guide, supra note 2, at 6 (policy terms have been discussed with
Internal Revenue Service officials).
I However, the insured is immediately entitled to $1,000 to reduce the initial impact of a
tax audit. See id. at 2.
See id. at 3, 23.
See id. at 4.
10 See id. at 6.
" See Novel Plan Will Insure Against Loss Due to Tax Audits, 19 Tax Notes 759 (1983).
12 See A Report on Tax Audit Insurance, supra note 5, at 55.
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Nonetheless, the advantages to the Government of tax audit in-
surance are speculative, while the dangers of encouraging taxpay-
ers to play the tax lottery are obvious.1 3 Many of the risks covered
by the insurance policy are items on which an aggressive taxpayer
might gamble, such as omitting noncash fringe benefits, distin-
guishing debt from equity, deducting hobby losses, calculating the
basis of inherited property, distinguishing ordinary from capital
asset property, deducting educational travel expenses, and valuing
charitable contributions. 4 The potential effect of tax audit insur-
ance on taxpayer compliance highlights the importance of deter-
mining how tax audit insurance should be taxed.
Section I of this article will explain the various ways the tax law
might treat personal insurance, i.e., insurance protecting against
risks arising from personal, rather than income-producing activi-
ties.15 This article considers five theories for taxing personal insur-
ance and then examines current law to determine whether any of
these theories have been adopted in the Internal Revenue Code
(Code). It deals first with insurance replacing lost income, such as
life and disability insurance, then considers insurance replacing
personal losses, such as medical insurance, and finally, it discusses
casualty insurance. Section II then applies this analysis to tax au-
dit insurance.
I. TAXING PERSONAL INSURANCE
A. Introduction
The taxation of personal insurance premiums and proceeds does
not fit easily into the conventional patterns of thought defining
taxable income. The premiums paid may eventually result in the
production of income as the result of an occurrence covered by the
policy, but the injured taxpayers do not really want the income to
be produced, and would prefer that the loss not occur. The premi-
ums, therefore, are usually characterized as personal, rather than
business, expenses."6 It is also true, however, that insurance premi-
'3 The risk covered by tax audit insurance is one of economic hardship only, as opposed
to the risk of bodily injury, which carries its own disincentives.
" See Audit Insurance Guide, supra note 2, at 14-19.
" Analysis of personal insurance is instructive because of its relationship to insurance
covering federal income taxes, which is a nondeductible expense.
"6 See infra note 18.
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ums are not typical personal consumption. Taxable personal con-
sumption usually provides the taxpayer with an immediate benefit,
such as food, travel, or clothing, rather than an opportunity to re-
ceive a large return on an investment. This distinction lends plau-
sibility to analyzing the premiums as an investment to produce
proceeds, despite the fact that it is an investment the taxpayer
does not want to realize. The tension between defining income
from personal insurance proceeds and conventional views of defin-
ing taxable income helps to explain the number of theories that
can justify how personal insurance should be taxed.
This article distinguishes between two types of personal insur-
ance. The first type replaces lost income.17 Typical examples are
life and disability insurance, which are personal insurance when
they cover risks arising from personal activity.' The proceeds of
such insurance might be tax-exempt, perhaps out of sympathy for
the insured and his family, but the taxpayer unquestionably has
income as a result of the insurance coverage. The second type of
17 This income, had it been earned, would have been taxable when received.
"S Disability insurance which covers only occupational hazards is not personal insurance,
but almost all other disability insurance, other than workmen's compensation, is personal
because it covers only personal risks or both business and personal risks. This view of disa-
bility insurance is taken by the Service in a number of rulings concerning nonoccupational
disability insurance. If money is withheld from an employee's wages for contribution to a
private disability plan, the amount withheld is a nondeductible personal expense. If money
is withheld for contribution to a state-imposed fund, however, the amount is deductible as
state taxes pursuant to § 164. See Rev. Rul. 81-194, 1981-2 C.B. 54; Rev. Rul. 81-193, 1981-2
C.B. 52; Rev. Rul. 81-192, 1981-2 C.B. 50; Rev. Rul. 81-191, 1981-2 C.B. 49. Premiums for
voluntarily purchased disability insurance are similarly considered nondeductible personal
expenses. See Rev. Rul. 70-394, 1970-2 C.B. 34 (insurance called "occupational" but cover-
age not limited to occupational hazards); Rev. Rul. 58-480, 1958-2 C.B. 62; Rev. Rul. 55-331,
1955-1 C.B. 271.
Insurance purchased by an employee to protect against unemployment due to an eco-
nomic recession would be an example of business, not personal, insurance. Cf. Rev. Rul. 75-
156, 1975-1 C.B. 66 (tax withheld for state unemployment compensation fund is deductible
as a business tax where fund pays wages lost due to business contingencies). An early ruling
dealing with disability insurance purchased as an adjunct to an unemployment insurance
program characterized the premiums as a business expense. See I.T. 3607, 1943 C.B. 110.
The ruling does not explicitly state that the insured risks included nonoccupational hazards,
but they probably did. It is therefore inconsistent with the above Revenue Rulings, which
characterize nonoccupational disablilty insurance premiums as personal expenses. Two
other rulings characterize an employee's payments to an unemployment insurance fund as a
business expense, without explaining what the insurance covered. See I.T. 3096, 1937-2 C.B.
81; I.T. 3085, 1937-1 C.B. 64. This characterization is also inconsistent with the more recent
rulings. For purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that the life and disability insurance
covers only losses from personal activity.
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personal insurance replaces a personal loss. The typical example is
medical insurance, which, in the conventional view,19 only compen-
sates for a personal loss, and, therefore, does not produce income.20
B. Replacing Lost Income-Life and Disability Insurance
1. Theories of Taxing Life and Disability Insurance
a. Expenses to produce income
The first way to conceptualize personal insurance is that the
premiums purchase future income, in the form of insurance pro-
ceeds. This view of insurance seems correct for life and disability
insurance, a primary purpose of which is to replace the insured's
lost earnings. If life and disability insurance premiums are ana-
lyzed for tax purposes as the cost of acquiring the income pro-
duced by the insurance, the correct treatment of the premiums de-
pends on how the proceeds are taxed. If the statute excludes the
income from the tax base, the premiums are not deductible be-
cause they are expenses of producing tax-exempt income.21 If the
" If, contrary to this view, reimbursement of medical costs is considered income, then
medical insurance should be treated like life and disability insurance. See supra notes 17-18
and accompanying text.
20 Compare Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 309
(1972) with Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an "Ideal"
Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far From Ideal World, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 831
(1979). The contrast between insurance which replaces income and insurance which com-
pensates for a personal loss is illustrated by the following example. Assume the taxpayer has
$100 cash income if no loss occurs. Insurance proceeds, if a loss occurs, would be $24. If the
insured recovers insurance proceeds of $24, he has $124 cash. However, his income under
the two types of insurance is very different. Disability or life insurance produces an addi-
tional $24 gain, minus the premium, and his total income is increased by that gain. The tax
law might not tax that gain for various reasons, but the proceeds are clearly income since
they replace lost income.
By contrast, medical insurance, in the conventional view, does not replace lost income and
does not produce a gain. The medical costs are a personal loss, and their replacement is not
income. Although the insured has $124 cash receipts, his income is still only $100. The pre-
miums are, therefore, not an investment which can produce a gain, but are a maintenance
expense to preserve the taxpayer's standard of living against the hazards covered by the
insurance.
An example of personal insurance which produces taxable proceeds is casualty insurance
which reimburses normal living expenses. See infra text accompanying notes 76-77. It is also
possible to view life and disability insurance like medical insurance, as replacing a personal
loss. If that view prevailed, life and disability insurance would be analyzed the same way as
personal insurance replacing a personal loss.
2, See I.R.C. § 265(1). Disallowing the deduction of expenses to produce tax-exempt in-
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proceeds are taxable, the premiums are deductible income-produc-
ing expenses.
b. Social wealth redistribution
The second way to view personal insurance is in accordance with
its social function of redistributing wealth. The effect of insurance
is to shift wealth from those who pay premiums and do not suffer a
loss to those who pay premiums and do suffer a loss. From soci-
ety's perspective, there is no income; the premiums paid are a
debit in the social balance sheet, which offset the credit enjoyed by
those who collect insurance proceeds.22 If the insurance proceeds
are tax-exempt, for whatever reason, the premiums would not be
deductible.23 This assures that the net result to society will be
zero, 24 which reflects the wealth redistribution feature of the insur-
ance. If the insurance proceeds were taxable, a zero balance in so-
cial wealth would be reflected in the tax law by permitting a de-
duction for the premiums.
The social wealth approach to taxation runs counter to the usual
treatment of each individual as a separate taxpayer, entitled to be
taxed in accordance with how his expenses and receipts fit the ba-
come is a questionable result when applied to the net losses from the activity. The reason
for disallowing deductions when the related income is exempt is that otherwise the taxpayer
could shelter taxable income from other sources with the expenses while excluding the ex-
pense-produced income. Cf. Rev. Rul. 83-3, 1983-1 C.B. 72 (no deduction allowed when tax-
free reimbursements are received for business expenses because the purpose of the exemp-
tion is to assure tax-free enjoyment of the reimbursement whether or not the expense is a
deductible business expense, not to permit the expense to shelter other income). If the ex-
penses produce a net loss from the activity, deduction of only the net loss does not permit
expenses equal to tax-exempt income to shelter taxable income. However, as long as the tax
law disallows a deduction for expenses to produce tax-exempt income, whether or not there
is a net loss, there is no special reason to make an exception for insurance premiums which
produce a net loss because there are no proceeds to be collected.
22 This disregards the income retained by the insurance company.
23 The taxpayer is "taxed" on these premiums in the sense that he is not allowed a deduc-
tion for the amount paid. Accordingly, this term will be used to describe the situation where
the premiums are nondeductible.
24 The net societal effect is zero so long as one and only one of the two groups of transac-
tions is taxed. For example, assume 10 taxpayers each paid $10 premiums, and one of the 10
received proceeds of $100 for a deficiency on his tax return. If the $100 proceeds are taxed,
and the $100 premiums are also taxed (not deductible), the group as a whole must pay taxes
on more income than they would have had they not purchased insurance. A similar gain
would result if neither the proceeds nor the premiums were taxed, because the group has
effectively deducted $100 of their cumulative tax liability.
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sic definition of income. However, some areas of the Code can be
explained using this theory. One such area is intrafamily gifts,
where the payor (donor) does not deduct a gift to a donee, and the
donee is not taxed on the gift,2 5 even though it might make sense
to tax the donee rather than the donor. Another example is section
274,26 which deals with entertainment expenses and disallows the
employer's deduction as a proxy for taxing employees on income
which the employees are unlikely to report. Finally, in certain cir-
cumstances, an accrual basis taxpayer may not accelerate deduc-
tions for obligations which the payees do not have to report until
the cash is received.27 Denying a payor's deduction for insurance
premiums cannot, however, be justified on these grounds since
there are no administrative problems in taxing the payee, and
there is no opportunity to manipulate the relationship between the
payor and payee.
c. Premiums as current value of proceeds
Another theory of personal insurance views the premiums as the
current value of the insurance proceeds. This perspective on pre-
miums is an application of the broader principle that any invest-
ment, considered before realization of the income, equals the fu-
ture income discounted for risk and passage of time. Thus, if there
is a one in one hundred chance of recovering $100,000 tomorrow,
the investment would be $1,000, which is the present value of
$100,000 discounted by the probability of recovery. The same com-
putations equate the tax on the premiums to the tax on the pro-
ceeds, assuming the premiums and proceeds would be taxed at the
same rate. Thus, a 50% tax on $100,000 equals $50,000, the pre-
sent value of which, discounted by a one in one hundred chance of
recovery, is $500, which equals 50% of the $1,000 premium.
A theory of taxing insurance which builds on this relationship
would tax the premiums as the equivalent of taxing the proceeds.
Thus, if the proceeds from life and disability insurance were not
taxed, nondeductibility of the premiums would be a proxy for tax-
ing the proceeds. If the proceeds were taxed, the premiums would
2 See I.R.C. § 102(a).
2 See id. § 274(a), (e)(4).
27 See id. § 267(a)(2), (b).
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be deductible. 8
Equating premiums and proceeds for tax purposes is as problem-
atical as the social wealth redistribution approach to taxing insur-
ance. Neither approach taxes individuals on the basis of their
unique experiences, but rather, both theories are based on the rela-
tionship between the premiums and the proceeds. In the "social
wealth redistribution" theory,29 the relationship is established by
the social balance sheet, even though one taxpayer's premiums
fund another taxpayer's proceeds. In the "premiums equal pro-
ceeds" theory, the relationship is established by the before-the-fact
equality between an investment and investment proceeds. In either
case, an explanation is required to justify incorporating the rela-
tionship into the tax law when it runs counter to the common intu-
ition that the income tax is an individual tax.30
d. Personal origin
The fourth theory of taxing insurance, like the first, looks at pre-
miums from the perspective of each individual's experience, but it
differs from the first theory because it does not analyze the premi-
ums as the cost of producing the benefits. In fact, the fourth the-
ory is not a theory about taxing proceeds at all, but, instead, ana-
lyzes the premiums and proceeds separately. Premiums are
nondeductible personal expenses or deductible business expenses
depending on whether the insured activity is personal or business
in nature. This theory is generally associated with United States v.
Gilmore,3 1 where the Supreme Court used the personal origin of
the taxpayer's marital dispute to characterize litigation costs as
nondeductible personal expenses, regardless of the fact that their
purpose was to retain the taxpayer's income-producing wealth. The
expense was personal because the litigation arose out of the tax-
payer's marital situation, which was a personal concern. Under this
28 This is the approach suggested by the Treasury Department. See U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury, Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform 59-61 (1977), reprinted in 1 A. Kragen & J.
McNulty, Federal Income Taxation 568-69 (3d ed. 1979).
29 See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
30 Compare Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87
Harv. L. Rev. 1113 (1974) with Warren, Would a Consumption Tax be Fairer Than an
Income Tax?, 89 Yale L.J. 1081 (1980). See generally Kelman, Time Preference and Tax
Equity, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 649 (1983).
3 372 U.S. 39, 48 (1963).
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theory, the premiums which purchase insurance to protect against
personal risks are not deductible, whether the proceeds are taxable
income, exempt income, or not income at all, because denial of the
deduction depends on their origin, not their relation to the
proceeds.
One objection to taxing premiums without regard to the taxabil-
ity of the proceeds is that personal insurance provides security to
the individual, which is too ephemeral to be taxable income. Al-
though all personal consumption is psychic, regardless of what the
taxpayer actually purchases, insurance seems different because
taxing the premiums is arguably double taxation of the same flow
of funds which produces the proceeds. However, this argument
against taxing the premiums assumes that the taxation of premi-
ums should depend on how the insurance proceeds are taxed. It is
an echo of the social wealth redistribution theory,32 which requires
that the premiums and proceeds be considered together, even
though different taxpayers pay premiums and recover proceeds.
There is no a priori reason why the same flow of money cannot
produce two taxes for two separate individuals, as in fact occurs
when a taxpayer purchases household services with after-tax
income.
e. Policy implications
The fifth theory for taxing personal insurance is not a theory
defining income, but is concerned with the policy implications of
taxing premiums and uninsured losses.3 3 Although the first four
theories also embody policy considerations, they are considerations
concerning the fairness of the basic tax structure. The fifth theory
rests on policies concerning taxpayer behavior.
An important policy consideration is tax neutrality between
purchasing insurance and self-insuring. For example, if uninsured
losses do not reduce taxes, a deduction for premiums would favor
purchasing insurance over not purchasing insurance, but if an un-
insured loss lowers taxes, disallowing a deduction for the premiums
favors self-insurance. Proponents of tax neutrality would argue for
32 See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
" Cf. Popkin, Household Services and Child Care in the Income Tax and Social Secur-
ity Laws, 50 Ind. L.J. 238 (1975) (child care deductions should be defended because they
promote tax neutrality, not because they accurately define income).
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similar treatment of insurance and self-insurance. They would per-
mit the deduction of premiums if losses are deductible, but deny a
deduction for premiums if uninsured losses do not reduce taxes.34
Tax neutrality is, however, just one policy which might be ad-
vanced. In addition, the overall societal effect of taxing these pre-
miums and proceeds should be considered. The social effects of en-
couraging either insurance or self-insurance might be more
favorable than tax neutrality. The Gilmore case35 itself is a good
example of how tax policy and income definition issues become in-
tertwined. The Court not only noted that the origin of the litiga-
tion was a personal activity, but also suggested that it would be
undesirable to favor the litigation efforts of taxpayers with income-
producing assets by permitting the deduction of litigation
expenses.3
2. Current Law
Current law offers little guidance as to which theory of taxing
insurance the Code adopts. Life and disability insurance premiums
are not deductible, 37 but the proceeds are tax-exempt.3 " Nonde-
ductibility of the premiums is, therefore, consistent with all of the
theories discussed above.3 9 If the premiums are a cost of producing
the proceeds, the exemption of the proceeds justifies disallowing
34 Section 1231(a) (last sentence) achieves tax neutrality between insuring and self-insur-
ing by permitting an ordinary loss deduction for the self-insured's business losses in excess
of insurance proceeds. The premiums are already deductible under § 162.
35 372 U.S. 39 (1963). See discussion at supra note 31 and accompanying text.
" See 372 U.S. at 48-49.
37 See Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(1) (life insurance); supra note 18 (disability insurance).
" See I.R.C. §§ 101(a) (life insurance), 104(a)(3) (disability insurance).
39 This article focuses on the individual's purchase of insurance as the prototype of how
insurance is taxed. The tax law provides different rules if the taxpayer is an employee for
whom the employer buys insurance. For life insurance, the premiums (and the proceeds
received by the beneficiary, see id. § 101) are excluded from the insured's taxable income for
up to $50,000 of group term life insurance, if nondiscrimination rules are satisfied. See id. §
79. For disability insurance, the premiums are excluded, but the benefits are taxable, see id.
§§ 105, 106, subject to a tax credit if the disability is severe and other income is not too
high. See id. § 22(a), (b)(2), (c), (d). The exclusion of premiums when the insurance is fi-
nanced by employers is not inconsistent, however, with the general rule that personal insur-
ance premiums are taxed. The exclusion results from a policy of encouraging employer in-
surance plans and from the economic similarity between unfunded employer promises, on
which a cash basis employee is not taxed, and employer-funded insurance. The rules gov-
erning employer-funded insurance are not applicable to the treatment of personal insurance
generally.
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the deduction. Exempting the proceeds also justifies disallowing a
deduction for the premiums if the premiums are viewed as a redis-
tribution of wealth or as the present value of the proceeds. Under
either of these two theories, only one tax should be imposed, and
exemption of the proceeds requires that the premiums be taxed.
The personal origin of the risks also results in nondeductibility of
the premiums. Finally, a deduction for premiums would be con-
trary to the tax neutrality policy because the uninsured taxpayer
who experiences a loss enjoys no tax reduction, other than that in-
cident to not receiving taxable income. There is no provision for
downward income averaging to account for declining income after
a loss occurs, and there is only a limited provision for a tax credit
for a disabled taxpayer under such narrowly defined circumstances
that it is unlikely to affect the choice between insurance and self-
insurance.40
Occasionally, courts have recognized the uncertainty surround-
ing which theory justifies disallowing a deduction for insurance
premiums.' If a taxpayer buys life insurance and it is unclear
whether it serves a business or personal purpose, the taxpayer will
argue that the business purpose is sufficiently dominant to justify
a deduction. The court can avoid the issue, however, by relying
either on the nondeductibility of personal insurance premiums or
on the rules denying a deduction for life insurance premiums be-
cause the proceeds are tax exempt.2'
The same equivocation is possible with disability insurance.
When a taxpayer buys disability insurance, the deduction is usu-
ally disallowed because of the personal origin of the insurance,
even though it protects against loss of income. 43 However, the fact
40 See I.R.C. § 22. The tax benefits are focused on low income taxpayers who are not
likely to buy disability insurance in the first place. Moreover, to be eligible for the credit,
the taxpayer must be permanently and totally disabled, which is more severe than many
insurance policies require. See id. § 22(b).
"' See, e.g., Hills v. Commissioner, 691 F.2d 997, 1005-06 (11th Cir. 1982).
4" See King v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1343 (1963) (premiums paid for life insur-
ance to secure a loan constituted nondeductible personal expenses).
41 See supra note 18; see also Blaess v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 710, 714-17 (1957) (alter-
natively holding that the premiums were not deductible because they were not related ei-
ther to business or to income production).
Rev. Rul. 55-264, 1955-1 C.B. 11, fits into this analysis only on tax neutrality grounds. It
permits a business expense deduction for disability insurance premiums if the proceeds
cover business overhead expenses, despite the personal origin of the risk. Because overhead
expenses would be deductible expenses if the taxpayer did not own insurance, deducting the
1985]
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that the proceeds are exempt also provides a justification for disal-
lowing the deduction. Thus, when an employer buys disability in-
surance to protect against an employee's disability, the deduction
of the premiums as a business expense is disallowed because the
income is exempt."
C. Replacing Personal Loss-Medical Insurance
1. Theories of Taxing Medical Insurance
The first theory for taxing personal insurance, which relates pre-
miums to the production of proceeds,45 cannot be applied to medi-
cal insurance in the same manner as to life and disability insurance
because the proceeds, under the conventional view, are not income.
The premiums, therefore, are not a cost of producing income.
Under the first theory, the premiums are nonetheless related to
the proceeds for tax purposes. As a result, they would be conceptu-
alized as a cost of maintaining income free from the burden of
medical costs. As maintenance expenses, they would be deductible
as costs to preserve a level of risk-free taxable income."'
The second theory, which views insurance as social wealth redis-
tribution, 7 would produce a different result than in the case of life
or disability insurance, where the proceeds do not produce a net
social loss. Under this theory, the proceeds are excludible because
they merely replace a personal loss, and the premiums are deducti-
ble to reflect the net social loss.
The third theory, which analyzes premiums as an investment to
produce income, cannot be applied to medical insurance if the
proceeds do not produce income. Since the proceeds are not in-
come, this theory is irrelevant.
The fourth theory, which focuses on the origin of the expense, 49
would deny a deduction for premiums because the insurance covers
a personal risk. The taxation of the proceeds is irrelevant under
this theory, because the proceeds and premiums are not related for
premium produces neutrality between insuring and self-insuring.
14 See Rev. Rul. 66-262, 1966-2 C.B. 105; supra note 21.
41 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
46 See I.R.C. § 212(2).
41 See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
41 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
41 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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tax purposes.
The fifth theory is concerned with the impact of tax rules on
taxpayer behavior.6 0 If tax neutrality between purchasing insur-
ance and self-insuring was the favored policy, then medical insur-
ance premiums would be deductible if medical expenses were de-
ductible. Conversely, if medical expenses were not deductible, the
premiums would not be deductible. If tax neutrality was less pref-
erable than favoring or discouraging the purchase of insurance,
then the taxation of premiums would not depend on how the ex-
penses were taxed.
2. Current Law
Current law excludes medical insurance proceeds from income, 51
but still allows a deduction for medical insurance premiums.2 This
is in sharp contrast Lo the rules applicable to life and disability
insurance, where the proceeds are not taxable, but the premiums
are not deductible.53
The rules applicable to medical insurance might be interpreted
as expressing a preference for the first or second theories, which
permit deduction of premiums, either as a maintenance expense or
because the redistribution of wealth produces a net social loss.
However, the history of the deduction of medical insurance premi-
ums belies this interpretation; instead, it suggests that, but for pol-
icy considerations, the premiums would be nondeductible personal
expenses. 4 There is no explanation of why medical insurance pre-
miums were included in the definition of deductible medical ex-
50 See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
" See I.R.C. § 104(a)(3).
' See id. § 213(a), (d)(1)(C).
'3 See supra notes 18, 37-38.
" In Green v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1229, 1235-36 (1980), the taxpayer sold blood
plasma as her primary source of income and deducted her medical insurance premiums. The
court held that insuring against the costs of maintaining personal health was primarily a
personal, not a business, concern and, therefore, the premiums were personal, rather than
business expenses. See id. at 1235-36. There was no indication in the case that the insurance
covered only medical problems arising from the business of selling plasma. If only business
risks had been covered, the insurance premiums might have been deductible business ex-
penses. Cf. Denny v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 738, 743 (1935) (cost of replacing teeth lost
while acting in a prize fight film held to be a business expense); Rev. Rul. 58-382, 1958-2




penses when the medical expense deduction was adopted in 1942,11
but subsequent history indicates a tax neutrality objective. Before
1965, medical expenses, including insurance premiums, were de-
ductible if they exceeded a percentage of adjusted gross income.58
The floor discouraged the purchase of insurance, '7 however, so the
law was changed in 1965 to permit a deduction for a portion of
medical insurance premiums without regard to the percentage
floor.58 In 1982, this generous treatment of insurance premiums
was repealed, 59 again for policy reasons unrelated to the definition
of income."
D. Casualty Insurance
1. Theories of Taxing Casualty Insurance
The tax analysis of casualty insurance on personal assets is more
complicated because the proceeds can be used either to replace the
lost asset or for an entirely different purpose. In addition, the pro-
ceeds may serve only to allow the taxpayer to recover his invest-
ment in the asset without producing gain.
The first theory, which analyzes premiums as the cost of produc-
ing insurance proceeds," would be applied in the following man-
ner: if no loss occurred, the premiums would be viewed as an ex-
pense of maintaining the use value of the asset. If the asset were
lost and the proceeds were used to replace the asset, it is still rea-
51 Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 127, 56 Stat. 798, 825-26
6 See I.R.C. § 213(a) (1965).
1 See H.R. Rep. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 137 (1965). The concern was that medical
insurance spread medical costs over a long time period so that the annual insurance premi-
ums were below the floor for medical expense deductions, while the uninsured taxpayer
could deduct some of his expenses when a large medical expense was incurred. See also
Hills v. Commissioner, 691 F.2d 997, 1005 (11th Cir. 1982) (interpreting the medical expense
deduction for insurance premiums as a tax neutrality provision, equalizing insurance and
self-insurance).
58 See I.R.C. § 213(a)(2) (1966).
59 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 202(a), 96 Stat.
324, 421.
60 The Joint Committee on Taxation stated that repeal would simplify tax returns, see
Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., General Explanation of the Reve-
nue Provisions of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 24 (Comm. Print
1982), but an additional reason was growing concern with the effect of tax deductions on
skyrocketing medical costs. See id. (generous employer insurance plans lead to overuse of
medical services).
• " See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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sonable to analyze the premiums as an expense of maintaining the
prior use value. In both of these cases, the premiums would or
would not be deductible, depending on whether the use value was
taxable. If the asset were lost and the proceeds were not reinvested
in a similar asset, however, the taxpayer could realize gain on re-
covery of the proceeds; accordingly, the premiums might be ana-
lyzed as a cost of producing the proceeds, which would reduce the
gain or increase the loss.2 It might be more reasonable, however,
to view the premiums as a cost of maintaining the old asset
whether or not the lost property is replaced, because the insurance
was probably acquired for maintenance purposes, even if the tax-
payer changes his plans and does not replace the old asset after a
loss occurs.
The second theory taxes either the premiums or the proceeds,
but not both, on the assumption that there is a redistribution of
wealth and that the tax law should reflect this fact.6 3 The difficulty
with applying this theory to casualty insurance is that the insured
does not recognize income if the proceeds do not exceed the basis
of the property at the time of the loss. 4 In that respect, the insur-
ance is analogous to medical insurance, and, consequently, the pre-
miums should be deductible to reflect the net social loss, even
though the proceeds were not taxed. If the taxpayer realizes a gain,
however, the premiums would or would not be deductible, depend-
ing on whether the proceeds were taxed, as in the case of life and
disability insurance.
The third theory, equating the premiums with the net present
value of the proceeds, 5 is also hard to apply to casualty insurance
because there may not be a gain. This theory permits taxing pre-
miums as a proxy for taxing proceeds, but is irrelevant if there is
no gain to tax. To the extent of the gain, however, either the pre-
62 The proceeds might be broken down into two components. One component is noted in
the text, i.e., the proceeds received on disposition of an investment. A second component is
tax-exempt income, which arises because the tax law does not require a reduction of cost for
personal assets equal to prior personal consumption. By permitting taxpayers to recover
their entire costs against proceeds of a disposition, the tax law in effect permits a deduction
for personal consumption. Consequently, the premiums allocable to the tax-exempt income
should not be deductible.
*" See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
6 To the extent of basis, proceeds equal wealth already taxed. Proceeds in excess of basis
constitute taxable gain. See I.R.C. § 1001.
6 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
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miums or proceeds should be taxed, but not both.
The fourth theory, making taxation of the premiums dependent
on the origin of the insured activity,"6 would deny a deduction if
the risk had a personal origin, without regard to what happened to
the asset or the insurance proceeds. The premiums are not ana-
lyzed for tax purposes as a cost of producing income but only in
relation to the origin of the insured risk. If the risk relates to per-
sonal assets, the premiums are a nondeductible personal expense.
The fifth theory would permit a deduction for premiums if the
taxpayer could deduct an uninsured loss, assuming that tax neu-
trality between purchasing insurance and self-insuring is
desirable.67
2. Current Law
The taxation of casualty insurance proceeds reflects the differ-
ent ways in which taxpayers use the proceeds. Reinvestment of
proceeds in similar property results in tax deferral of the gain. 8
Any other use of the proceeds results in taxing the proceeds in ex-
cess of basis.6 9
With regard to the premiums, the regulations are unequivocal in
treating them as nondeductible personal expenses.7 0 There is little
pressure to consider whether this is the correct rule, however, be-
cause in the usual case the property is either not lost or the tax-
payer reinvests the proceeds in a similar asset. In such cases, all of
the theories would deny a deduction for the premiums.
Under the first theory, the premiums would not be deductible as
an income-producing expense because the income from using the
asset is not taxed. The second and third theories would permit a
deduction if the proceeds were taxable, but there is no practical
way to decide at the time the premiums are paid whether the pro-
ceeds will be reinvested in a similar asset and tax thereby deferred.
Therefore, a general rule is needed based on probable taxpayer be-
havior. The most reasonable rule would assume reinvestment of
66 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
67 See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
" See I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2).
69 See id.
" See Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(2) (personal residence); see also Paal v. Commissioner, 37
T.C.M. (CCH) 252, 254 (1978), aff'd on other grounds, 450 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir. 1971).
394 [Vol. 4:379
Tax Audit Insurance
the proceeds in a similar asset, which would result in both defer-
ring taxation of the proceeds, and in denying a deduction for pre-
miums. Under the fourth theory, no deduction would be allowed
because the origin of the expense is personal. Finally, the fifth the-
ory, which promotes tax neutrality between purchasing insurance
and self-insuring, might permit a deduction for casualty insurance
premiums because uninsured casualty losses are deductible.71
There is no deduction, however, for the lost value of the asset in
excess of cost,72 and the deduction of cost is, under a recent
amendment, limited to losses in excess of ten percent of adjusted
gross income." Since losses are not usually deductible, to achieve
tax neutrality, a deduction for premiums must be disallowed.
In the unusual case of a taxpayer who collects casualty insurance
proceeds on personal assets and does not reinvest them in a similar
asset, the insurance proceeds can produce taxable gain. The tax-
payer might, therefore, argue that the transaction is entered into
for taxable profit, whether or not the proceeds exceed cost, and,
therefore, the premiums are deductible under the first theory. In
York v. Commissioner,7 4 for example, the taxpayer recovered pro-
ceeds which were less than the amount of the loss and added the
premiums to the deductible loss. The court, however, refused to
include the premiums in the loss deduction. The court stated that
the premiums were not related to the loss and could not be de-
ducted. 75 This statement can be interpreted as adopting the fourth
theory, i.e., that the premiums are personal expenses regardless of
what happens to the asset. Alternatively, it could mean that the
premiums are related to maintaining the tax-exempt use value of
the lost asset, despite the fact that the proceeds are used for a new
purpose. The case law is, therefore, equivocal about why premiums
are not deductible.
3. Reimbursement of Living Expenses
Casualty insurance might also reimburse a taxpayer for living
expenses incurred while the insured's home is being repaired or re-
" See I.R.C. § 165(c)(3).
"2 See id. § 165(b).
" See id. § 165(h)(2)(A) (generally effective for tax years beginning after Dec. 31, 1983).
14 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 988 (1974).
7 See id. at 990.
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placed. After years of uncertainty in the case law as to whether the
reimbursements were taxable income,76 Congress exempted the in-
surance proceeds to the extent that they reimburse the taxpayer
for the excess of expenses over normal living costs. 7 The rationale
for exempting these reimbursements is closely related to that
which exempts medical insurance proceeds, i.e., the expenses do
not increase the taxpayer's standard of living and, therefore, are
not taxable.
Because a portion of the casualty insurance proceeds may be
taxable, it must be determined whether premiums for personal in-
surance are, for that reason, deductible. In Arnold v. Commis-
sioner,78 the taxpayer argued that the premiums should reduce
taxable proceeds, in terms reflecting the first theory, which per-
mits deductions if the expenses produce taxable proceeds. 7 The
court's opinion does not reject this argument out of hand, noting
only that the expenses could not in any event be deductible in the
year the proceeds were collected because the taxpayer was a cash
basis taxpayer, and the premiums had been paid in a prior year.8"
However, the court also stated that the insurance contract was en-
tered into for personal protection, rather than for profit; appar-
ently, the court also applied the personal origin theory in denying
the deduction.81 Once again, the case law is equivocal concerning
the theoretical basis for denying the deduction.8 2
76 Compare Millsap v. Commissioner, 387 F.2d 420 (8th Cir. 1968) (taxable), Cornelius v.
Commissioner, 56 T.C. 976 (1971) (taxable), and Rev. Rul. 59-360, 1959-2 C.B. 75 (taxable),
with Conner v. United States, 439 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1971) (not taxable).
7 See I.R.C. § 123.
78 289 F. Supp. 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
71 See id. at 209.
so See id.
81 See id.
82 One other straw in the wind concerns legal insurance. Under current law, both premi-
ums and proceeds are tax-free if they are funded as part of a qualified group employer plan.
See I.R.C. § 120. Without this provision, the proceeds would be taxable. It is unclear, how-
ever, what effect paying tax on legal insurance premiums would have on taxing the pro-
ceeds. There is a suggestion in the legislative history of the statute exempting legal insur-
ance premiums and proceeds that, without the exemption, either the premiums or the
proceeds would be taxed; however, the same source also states that taxable premiums might
reduce the amount of taxable proceeds. See Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess., General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 668 (Comm. Print 1976). In
rulings concerning nonqualified plans, the Service asserts that the proceeds would be taxa-
ble but does not state how the premiums would be taxed or what effect taxing the premiums
would have on taxing the proceeds. See Pvt. Ltr. Rul. 8129095 (undated); Pvt. Ltr. Rul.
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E. Conclusions About Taxing Personal Insurance
Taxation of personal insurance proceeds depends on what the
proceeds replace. Some proceeds replace personal losses and,
therefore, do not constitute income at all; on the other hand, insur-
ance proceeds which replace lost income conceptually should be
taxable income. The more difficult question is how the premiums
should be taxed.
The personal origin test83 is the most attractive explanation of
the disallowance of deductions for premiums. It has the advantage
of being a theory about how the income tax should be applied to
individuals, unlike the "social wealth redistribution""e or "premi-
ums equal proceeds"8 5 theories. Its main rival, which views the pre-
miums as related to the production of the proceeds," does not ac-
curately depict taxpayers' views of personal insurance. Taxpayers
do not want to collect proceeds. The insurance is a way of purchas-
ing security in the conduct of personal life and should be viewed as
a cost of that activity. 7
The origin test has a deceptively certain ring to it which implies
that an expense can be traced back to an originating cause in a
more or less mechanical manner. In actuality, however, the test is
more difficult to apply because tracing may lead to differing con-
clusions as to the personal or business nature of the source. 8  Con-
sequently, the ultimate legal question is whether an apparently
personal origin of an expense should characterize the expense as
personal for tax purposes or whether other factors intervene to
convert the expense to a cost of doing business.89 But because
8142136 (July 24, 1981).
83 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
8 See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
8 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
"6 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
87 See Popkin, supra note 4, at 404-05. This view is reflected by cases which state that
premiums cannot be related to insurance proceeds. See, e.g., York v. Commissioner, 33
T.C.M. (CCH) 988, 990 (1974) (premiums not connected with loss). See also Arnold v.
United States, 289 F. Supp. 206, 209 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (transaction not "entered into for
profit").
88 Like many statements in the law regarding causation, the origin test is not merely a
description of what happens; rather it is a judgment about the legal significance of events.
Cf. United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93, 105 (1972) (rejecting tort law concepts of proxi-
mate relationship as the tax law test for distinguishing capital from ordinary losses).
88 For example, litigation expenses to resist a court martial commenced on the ground
that failure to pay alimony is conduct unbecoming an officer are business expenses, see
19851 397
Virginia Tax Review
there is no litmus test for deciding when expenses originate in the
personal or business spheres of activity, policy criteria, such as tax
neutrality or other considerations, should play a role in deciding
how the expenses should be taxed.
In the next section, this article considers how tax audit insur-
ance would be taxed under the various theories that might apply to
personal insurance and concludes that a combination of the origin
test and the policy implications test should deny a deduction for
the premiums, regardless of whether proceeds are collected, or
whether the expenses covered by the insurance would be deducted.
II. TAX AUDIT INSURANCE
Tax audit insurance covers both tax deficiencies and the cost of
professional tax assistance. Each element of coverage raises differ-
ent questions and each will be discussed in turn.
A. Tax Deficiencies
1. Insurance Proceeds
Insurance proceeds covering tax deficiencies should be taxed for
the same two reasons that reimbursement of nondeductible per-
sonal expenses should be taxed-to enhance public acceptance of
the rate structure and to permit differently-situated taxpayers to
be taxed differently.
First, if income taxes or other personal expenses are deductible
in computing taxable income, tax rates would have to be increased
to achieve the required level of taxation. Even if all taxpayers in
the same tax bracket have deductions which are an equal percent-
age of income, so that an increase in tax rates could compensate
for the deduction of personal expenses without changing the tax
burden, the increase in rates would damage public perception of
the Government's objective." Rates would appear high, even
Howard v. Commissioner, 202 F.2d 28, 30-31 (9th Cir. 1953), despite their seemingly per-
sonal origin. But cf. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 48 (because of the personal origin
of taxpayer's marital dispute, the related litigation costs were characterized as nondeduct-
ible personal expenses, even though their purpose was to retain the taxpayer's income-pro-
ducing wealth).
O Rate adjustments could also compensate for deductions if all taxpayers had the same
dollar amount of deductions or had deductions which are the same percentage of income.
These situations are special cases of the less restrictive requirement that taxpayers in the
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though they would not result in a greater tax, taking into account
the increased deduction.
Second, if different taxpayers incur personal expenses but only
some of the taxpayers are reimbursed, exempting the reimbursed
expenses from taxation contravenes income tax objectives by tax-
ing differently-situated taxpayers equally; the taxpayers receiving
the reimbursements have more income available for personal con-
sumption than the unreimbursed taxpayers. Similarly, allowing tax
audit insurance proceeds to escape taxation would effectively allow
a deduction for federal income taxes since a third party would be
paying the taxpayer's liability; the taxpayer would not suffer a de-
cline in after-tax income. Under the well-established rule of Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner,91 the taxpayer receives taxable
income when his personal income taxes are paid for him by a third
party. Consistent with this precedent, tax audit insurance proceeds
should constitute taxable income to the recipient.92
2. Insurance Premiums
In addition to the decision to tax personal insurance proceeds, a
correlative decision must be made as to which theory of taxation
should be applied to the premiums. As concluded above with re-
gard to personal insurance,93 the personal origin theory is concep-
tually the most sound. Under that theory, a deduction for premi-
ums would be disallowed if the risk covered by the insurance is
personal, even if the proceeds are taxable."4 The question in apply-
same bracket have deductions which are the same percentage of income.
279 U.S. 716 (1929).
92 Clark v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 333 (1939), is not to the contrary. In that case the
taxpayer had to pay more tax than he originally thought he owed because of his tax advi-
sor's mistake. The advisor paid the taxpayer's excess taxes. The reimbursement was not
taxable because there was no gain, just as there is no gain when excess living costs are
reimbursed by an insurance company. See also Rev. Rul. 57-47, 1957-1 C.B. 23 (agreeing
with the Clark decision).
91 See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
94 The fifth theory, which deals with tax neutrality and the policy implications of a de-
duction, is discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 102-04. Additionally, under
the first theory, which conceptualizes the premiums as a cost of generating the proceeds, the
premiums would be a deductible expense to produce taxable income. Cf. Arnold v. United
States, 289 F. Supp. 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (premiums for insurance proceeds which reimburse
taxable living expenses might be deductible). Under the second theory, which treats the
insurance as a social wealth redistribution, the premiums would be deductible because there
should be only one tax on the insurance transaction, and the proceeds are taxable. Similarly,
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ing the origin test to tax audit insurance premiums, therefore, is
whether the risk of a tax deficiency is a personal risk. The risk
covered by tax audit insurance arises from both personal and in-
come-producing activities."5 Typically, the premiums cannot be
fairly and accurately allocated between these activities. As a result,
since the origin of the expense cannot be determined prospectively,
the taxpayer would not be allowed to deduct any of the
premiums. 6
under the third theory, which equates premiums with the present value of proceeds, there
should be a tax on either the proceeds or premiums, but not both; since the proceeds are
taxed, the premiums should be deducted.
9' Although it might seem that an income tax must arise from income-producing activi-
ties, that is not an accurate description of our federal income tax system. The income tax is
the result of both income-producing and personal activities, and insurance premiums to pro-
tect against the risk of additional income tax burdens arise from both sources.
The dual nature of the income tax is recognized in cases where a taxpayer claims that
state income taxes are deductible business expenses and, therefore, includible in the compu-
tation of net operating losses, which are generally limited to business expenditures. The
Service and courts have properly held that state income taxes are business expenses only if
the tax burden can be traced explicitly to taxation of business income. See Reise v. Commis-
sioner, 35 T.C. 571 (1961), aff'd, 299 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1962) (substantially all of the defi-
ciency concerned whether business income should be reported on an accrual rather than on
a cash basis); Rev. Rul. 70-40, 1970-1 C.B. 50 (state taxes on net income from business
profits are trade or business expenses). The same result is reached for expenses related to
state income tax deficiencies arising from business income determinations. See Wood v.
Commissioner, 37 T.C. 70 (1961) (legal fees related to determining state income tax defi-
ciency which was based, for all significant purposes, on adjustments to business income);
Polk v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 412 (1958), aff'd, 276 F.2d 601 (10th Cir. 1960) (interest on
state income tax deficiency attributable to revaluation of business inventory). Tax determi-
nation fees related to federal income taxes are also included in net operating loss computa-
tions if the origin of the dispute was the taxation of business income. See Wood, 37 T.C. at
76-78.
The state income tax is not, however, deductible from gross income to arrive at adjusted
gross income if the law imposes the tax on all income, rather than on business income alone,
even if in a particular case the tax falls on business income. See Tanner v. Commissioner, 45
T.C. 145 (1965), aff'd per curiam, 363 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1966); Rev. Rul. 70-40, 1970-1 C.B.
50. This distinction is based on legislative history concerning the definition of adjusted gross
income, which requires that business expenses which are deductible from gross income to
determine adjusted gross income be "directly" related to income production. See S. Rep.
No. 885, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25 (1944), cited in Tanner v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. at 147
n.2. In the usual case, there is no way to allocate income taxes between the personal and
business origin of the expense.
The New York State Bar Committee Report cites six examples of items covered under a
tax audit insurance policy, two of which involve personal activity. See A Report on Tax
Audit Insurance, supra note 5, at 54. The two examples are a transfer of property in a
divorce settlement and taxation of net gifts.
e Cf. Professional Services v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 888, 919-20 (1982) (taxpayer did not
provide any rational method to separate deductible tax planning expenses from nondeduct-
Tax Audit Insurance
Another challenge to applying the personal origin test to tax au-
dit insurance premiums is that the Code does not apply this test to
tax determination expenses, 91 which are similar to the premiums in
that they are intended to reduce the tax burden. The Supreme
Court has held that tax determination expenses incurred by a trust
were deductible expenses because they maintained income-produc-
ing property." The Treasury, rather than limiting the holding to
entities which had the preservation of property as their major ob-
jective, permitted income tax determination expenses incurred by
individuals to be deductible maintenance expenses, without regard
to whether the tax issues involved personal or income-producing
activities. 9
An additional reason for allowing the deduction of tax determi-
nation and litigation expenses is that tax determination expenses
should not be considered taxable personal consumption since they
arguably represent a major involuntary expenditure, essentially
thrust upon the taxpayer, draining his resources available to
purchase the basic necessities of food, clothing, and shelter. 00 In
this respect, tax determination expenses are similar to medical ex-
penses and reimbursement of excess living costs resulting from a
casualty. Tax audit insurance premiums, however, are not analo-
gous; they are voluntary rather than imposed by an outside source.
They are actually similar to purchasing security, which generally is
ible personal expenses); I.R.C. § 213(d)(6) (the premiums allocable to the medical insurance
element of medical/disability insurance are deductible only if the policy explicitly identifies
the medical insurance element); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(1) (education expenses which are
an inseparable aggregate of personal and capital expenses are not deductible). But see Meri-
ans v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 187, 189-90 (1973) (attorney's testimony provided a method to
allocate expenses to deductible tax advice). Additionally, the policy itself might allocate ad-
ditional premiums to specific activities; if so, the premiums allocated to business or income-
producing activities would be deductible. See also supra note 95 (third paragraph).
See I.R.C. § 212(3).
98 See Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 (1945).
See T.D. 5513, 1946-1 C.B. 61, amending Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(a)-15(b) (1946). This
taxation of tax determination expenses is consistent with the first theory, permitting a de-
duction of maintenance expenses, even though the expenses have a personal origin. How-
ever, this theory was not consistently applied by the Government. Litigation expenses aris-
ing from personal activities were not deductible simply because they maintained income-
producing assets. See id. Tax determination expenses related to gift taxes were an example
of such nondeductible expenses. See id.; see also Lykes v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 118
(1952).
o1 See M. Chirelstein, Federal Income Taxation 7.01, at 142 (3d ed. 1982).
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a nondeductible personal activity. 01
Another important policy furthered by allowing the deduction of
tax determination expenses is to encourage taxpayers to get the
"right answer" regarding the tax consequences of their activities.
Again, the analogy of tax determination expenses to tax audit in-
surance premiums is absent, because tax audit insurance may ar-
guably encourage taxpayers to take an overly aggressive position,
rather than the position they believe is correct, by allowing them
to deduct the cost of playing the "tax lottery."
This analysis reveals that the abandonment of the personal ori-
gin theory based on an analogy of tax audit insurance premiums to
tax determination expenses is not justified. Accordingly, applica-
tion of the personal origin theory indicates that tax audit insur-
ance premiums generally should not be deductible. 1°2 Moreover, an
examination of other policy implications reveals other strong bases
for disallowing the deduction.
Because tax payments are not deductible, a deduction for insur-
'2' See I.R.C. § 262. However, extension of § 212(3) to permit the deduction of tax plan-
ning expenses is a more direct challenge to applying the origin test to disallow a deduction
for tax audit insurance premiums because tax planning expenses cannot be analogized to tax
determination expenses. Tax planning expenses originating in personal activities, such as
marital or family property arrangements, are more like nondeductible expenses to stay
healthy than medical expenses incurred after getting sick. The Service has permitted tax
planning expenses to be deducted under § 212(3), see Rev. Rul. 72-545, 1972-2 C.B. 179 (tax
advice incident to divorce), but the Tax Court seems reluctant to accept this view. For ex-
ample, in Merians v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. at 188, the court stated that it accepted without
endorsing the Government's concession that estate tax planning expenses were deductible,
and a majority of the judges expressed doubts or affirmatively denied that the expenses
were deductible. See id. at 190-91 (Scott, J., concurring), 198 (Quealy, J., dissenting). But
see Carpenter v. United States, 338 F.2d 366 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (section 212(3) permits deduc-
tion of tax planning expenses); Merians v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. at 191 (Pay, J., concur-
ring) (tax planning expenses are deductible as § 212(2) maintenance expenses).
There could be policy reasons for permitting the deduction of tax planning expenses
which would not apply to tax audit insurance premiums. Through tax planning, a taxpayer
attempts to avoid incurring an obligation for more tax than is necessary, assuming the Gov-
ernment is fully aware of what the taxpayer has done. By contrast, a tax audit insurance
policyholder tries to reduce the financial burdens of what he owes, if it is discovered. A
policy which supports taxpayers in their efforts to avoid taxes legally by allowing a deduc-
tion for tax planning expenses would not support a deduction for an expense which permits
taxpayers to avoid confronting their tax burdens and thereby encourages them to take risks
by exploiting the tax lottery. Cf. Luman v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 846 (1982) (expenses to
rearrange personal property within a family are not deductible maintenance expenses); Epp
v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 801 (1982) (same).
202 Premiums directly allocable to income-producing activities would still be deductible.
See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
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ance premiums covering tax payments would provide an incentive
for purchasing insurance. The effect of such favoritism might not
be salutary. It is too early to know how tax audit insurance will
influence taxpayer behavior, but it might encourage taxpayers to
play the "tax lottery" by insulating them from the financial effect
of tax deficiencies. Therefore, the premiums should not be deducti-
ble in the absence of an explicit congressional judgment permitting
the deduction.
The New York Bar Association has proposed that premiums cov-
ering tax deficiencies should not be deducted but, rather, should
reduce any taxable proceeds collected by the insured. 03 Reducing
the taxable proceeds by the amount of the premium is, however,
inconsistent with the personal origin theory, which denies the de-
duction because of both the personal origin of the risk and the pol-
icy implications of permitting a deduction. A deduction is a deduc-
tion whether it reduces proceeds or reduces other income when no
proceeds are collected. The only virtue of the New York State Bar
solution is that a deduction for premiums is limited to the situa-
tion where the taxpayer has received taxable proceeds, which is
less serious than if premiums are deductible in all situations. Even
so, the incentive to purchase insurance is increased by any deduc-
tion, and it would be better to disallow the deduction in all
cases. 104
203 See A Report on Tax Audit Insurance, supra note 5, at 55.
"o' The New York Bar approach seems to adopt the first theory, where the premiums are
a cost of producing the proceeds. With regard to tax audit insurance, the better result is to
treat the premiums as unrelated to the proceeds from the loss, as with casualty insurance.
See York v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 988, 990 (1974). But cf. Gilmore v. United
States, 245 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (Mr. Gilmore persuaded the court to allow him to
add his otherwise nondeductible personal litigation costs to the basis of the property he was
trying to protect).
Another possible analogy, which would permit the premiums to reduce taxable proceeds
but not other income, is § 183. That section generally permits expenses to be deducted
against gross income, but prohibits net losses from being deducted. See I.R.C. § 183. Using
this analogy, the premiums would reduce insurance proceeds but not permit a deduction for
premiums if the proceeds did not materialize. The analogy should not apply to insurance,
however, because § 183 is aimed at personal hobbies and tax shelters where the taxpayer is
trying to produce gross income, even though the taxpayer does not care about net income.
Permitting the expenses to reduce gross income is a compromise reflecting this modified
income-producing motive. Personal insurance is not an activity which should be character-
ized for tax purposes as having even this modified income-producing purpose. If the risks
are personal and the tax policy implications favor disallowing the deduction, the premiums
should not be deductible, whether or not proceeds are collected.
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B. Tax Practitioners' Costs
In addition to covering tax deficiencies, tax audit insurance also
covers a limited amount of professional fees. These proceeds would
be included in gross income, 106 but would also be deductible as tax
determination expenses. 10 6 They should not be excluded from gross
income initially because the expenses can only be deducted as
itemized deductions, which reduce taxable income only if they ex-
ceed the zero bracket amount.1 0 7 The deduction should not be
more generously available when it is funded by insurance rather
than by the taxpayer's own resources.0 '
With respect to premiums relating to coverage for professional
fees, there is a stronger argument for not adopting the personal
origin theory than exists for tax deficiencies. This is because the
professional fees are in actuality tax determination expenses,
which are always deductible.10 9 Nevertheless, policy implications
indicate that premiums related to professional services should not
be deductible. As previously mentioned, the expenditure of funds
for these premiums is purely voluntary;1 allowing a deduction for
the premiums may actually encourage taxpayers to play the "tax
lottery" and, consequently, to be overly aggressive. The fact that
the actual expenses are deductible should not alter that
conclusion.1"'
The best argument for allowing deduction of the premiums is a
tax neutrality argument, since self-insurance would be favored if
the uninsured loss is deductible while the insurance premiums cov-
ering the same loss are not deductible. Notwithstanding that re-
sult, equal treatment of the self-insurer and the insurer is not nec-
essarily desirable. The deduction of professional fees still confronts
the taxpayer with a large after-tax cost. Premiums are small by
comparison, and their deduction would present too great a risk of
105 See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929) (taxpayer receives
income when a third party pays the taxpayer's personal expenses).
,o See I.R.C. § 212(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(1).
107 See I.R.C. § 211.
,o' If the insurance company takes over the litigation for its own purposes, the litigation
expenses would probably not be included in gross income because the company was incur-
ring the expenses for its own business reasons.
'o See I.R.C. § 212(3).
00 See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
" But see A Report on Tax Audit Insurance, supra note 5, at 55.
Tax Audit Insurance
encouraging taxpayers to play the tax lottery.'12
III. CONCLUSION
The taxation of any personal insurance raises questions which
have not received much attention because of the statutory exclu-
sion of the proceeds from taxable income. Tax audit insurance pro-
ceeds should not be exempt, however, because the application of
income definition principles requires taxation of proceeds. The
more difficult question is how the premiums should be taxed. This
question is difficult because it is not easy to characterize the
purchase of personal insurance as a traditional income-producing
activity or to dismiss it as having an obviously personal origin, de-
void of any income-producing function. Nonetheless, the personal
origin test requires that tax audit insurance premiums be included
in taxable income (by disallowing the deduction).
Applying the personal origin test to expenses related to income
taxes raises difficult questions since income taxes originate from
both personal and business activities. Moreover, the deduction of
tax determination expenses clouds the issue because it is not en-
tirely clear why these expenses are deductible and whether the
same rationale would justify deducting tax audit insurance premi-
ums. This article has argued that the potential personal origin of
some income tax disputes should characterize all tax audit insur-
ance premiums as personal and that the deduction of tax determi-
nation expenses rests on considerations not applicable to tax audit
insurance premiums.
In reaching these conclusions, the article also considered the pol-
icy implications of deducting the premiums. The rules for deduct-
ing personal insurance premiums and, more generally, the applica-
tion of the origin test, should be influenced by the effect a
deduction might have on taxpayer behavior. Because permitting a
deduction for tax audit insurance premiums could encourage tax-
payers to play the tax lottery, a deduction should not be allowed,
"I A countervailing policy consideration in the case of professional fees is the desirability
of professional representation in disputes with the Government. Cf. Tellier v. Commissioner,
383 U.S. 687 (1966). If this consideration overcomes the reasons for disallowing the deduc-
tion, only that portion of the premiums allocable to professional fees should be deductible.
That amount is likely to be very small and should, in any event, be deductible only if it is
earmarked in the insurance policy and is reasonable in amount. Cf. I.R.C. § 213(d)(6) (medi-
cal insurance with a disability insurance feature).
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either to offset collected proceeds or to reduce other taxable in-
come if no loss occurs.
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